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The Concept of the State in Marx, and Engels: A re-examination 
Thesis directed by Professor David Hawkins
Much has been said and written about the Marxist view of 
the state. It is the intent of this analysis to investigate 
what Marx and Engels mean when they speak of the state and, in 
particular, what they mean when they describe the state as an 
oppressive instrument of the ruling class. This will of course 
require some discussion of the relationship between classes and 
the state.
When we have arrived at some understanding of what is 
entailed in the notion of the state as an instrument of 
oppression, we shall attempt to show that Marx ard Engels 
have a special understanding of the term, “state,“ and that 
it is this understanding which allows or forces the Marxists 
to argue that the state must “wither away" when classes have 
disappeared. This does not mean, however, that the rule of 
oppression is replaced by the rule of anarchy. We argue that 
the classless communist society is not one where the state 
is absent; rather, a certain kind of state is no longer pre- 
sent. The oppressive state will cease to exist, but a state of
iii
a different sort will take its place.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is almost certainly true that every beginning student 
of political science or philosophy is aware of at least some­
thing of the writings of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels# Certain 
aspects of their thinking are, of course, much more familiar 
than are others and while only a few specialists may know and 
understand Marx’s pioneering analysis of the business cydLe, 
nearly all have at least a casual awareness of such terms as 
“Dictatorship of the Proletariat,1* "Surplus Value,® “Historical 
Materialism,* and •"Withering Away of the State.* Yet, as is 
so often the case with the superficially familiar, such terms 
seem frequently to be thoroughly misunderstood.
In this analysis we will concern ourselves with what 
Marx and Engels had in mind when they spoke of the state and 
its withering away. Our discussion will not be consigned to 
the mechanics of the process of the withering; for, we must 
discuss, in addition, those issues and elements which cause 
and which antedate the process. We must determine exactly 
what Marx and Engels understood by the term "state," and we 
must decide whether their understanding and use of the word
2amounted to something quite different from what a traditional or 
classical theorist like Hobbes meantby the term.
After having determined what it is that Marx and Engels 
call the state, we will turn to the question of its role or 
place in their political theory. We must ask and attempt to 
give a satisfactory answer to the question of what sort of state 
it is that withers away, and what sort of entity, if any, is to 
take its place. Finally, we will try to reach some conclusion 
about what is among the more difficult and obscure aspects of 
Marxism. Do Marx and Engels actually think that the state is 
abolished even after the final victory of the proletariat?
Will their utopian vision be genuinely apolitical and thoroughly 
different from what theorists like Hobbes and .Rousseau had en­
visaged?
It will be our contention that Marx and Engels are not 
really suggesting a kind of utopia in which the state disappears; 
rather, a particular kind of state passes out of existence.
Any suggestion that they are dispatching all states is as base­
less as the assertion that Hobbes would do away with the state. 
This is what we hope to demonstrate, and it is to this and to 
the supporting data that we must now turn.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE STATE FOR MARX AND ENGELS
It has by now become almost trivial to speak of important 
men and their theories as products of their times and of the 
setting in which they lived. Nonetheless, in assessing the 
nature and direction of such theories, it is necessary to ack­
nowledge the effect of circumstances contemporary to them.
In political thought and theory this is abundantly clear. 
Aristotle designed his Politics on the order of the small 
"polis" whose constitution and physical limitation he knew 
intimately.The “realpolitik” of Machiavelli was conditioned 
not merely fcy an abstract belief about human nature and fortune, 
but also by a series of Italian wars, his career as a Florentine 
ambassador,, and his relationship to his patrons.2 In assessing 
the adequacies or inadequacies of Hobbes' writings, we must 
always remember the English civil wars and the polemical argu­
ments of Royalists and anti-Royalists."^
■^ •Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, I9I46), p. xlvii.
2«J. R. Hale, Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy (New York: 
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., I960), pp. 5l-77, 3rd ed.
G^eorge H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 195l), p. 14-56.
il
In order to understand and to evaluate what Iferx and Engels 
meant when they wrote and spoke of the state, we must, of course, 
be aware of the fact that they too were conditioned by their 
period and historical milieu. When they write about the state, 
they are talking, almost without exception, about some histori­
cal event or process. When they write, however, they are writing 
not only as political theorists, but also as political polemi­
cists. The relation between them and the political and economic 
events of which they speak is a symmetrical one. This is to say 
that as theorists they are not merely passive. They are not 
merely acted upon by contemporary events; for, as perspicacious 
theorists and observers they are also able to sieze the oppor­
tunity such events provide. The revolutions which they or their 
contemporaries knew intimately and the economic strain of the 
industrial revolution were facts which Marx and Engels could 
select and use in order to support and to objectify their in­
sights. These were, as they must have known, the kind of events 
required to give their theories and polemics a genuine exis­
tence.
In our own time we find a somewhat parallel phenomenon 
in the budding and acceptance of existential philosophy and 
literature. Against a background of the Second World War, the 
Occupation, and the French Resistance, men like Sartre and 
Camus were able to unite meaningfully and to gain, at least,
5a philosophic and literary hearing for “Good Faith,” "Bad Faith,1 
and A^uthentic Existence."
■When Engels and Marx describe the state, they are not 
indulging in political metaphysics. Rather, they are using events 
and circumstances familiar to their reading public in order to 
identify and to criticize an existing or previously existing state 
of affairs. So it is that Engels describes it in the Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State in a manner generally 
characteristic of what he or Marx has said of it in some book or 
paper about a particular event. It is in this work that Engels 
discusses in some detail the evolution of the state and the 
manner in which the state emerged from the “gentes" of Rome 
or Athens or from the various Germanic tribal organizations.
He makes it unmistakably clear that the state is a product of 
historical and social evolution.
It /the State7 is simply a product of society at 
a certain stage of evolution. It is the confession 
that this society has become hopelessly divided 
against itself, has entangled itself in irrecon­
cilable contradictions which it is powerless to 
banish.^
These divisions are, as Engels pointed out earlier in 
the work, the result of economic forces which brought into 
being the classes of freemen and slaves, overlords and serfs
F^rederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Pro­
perty and the State, trans. Ernest Unterman (Chicago: Charles H. 
Kerr and Co., 1902), p. 206.
6or, more generally, the wealthy exploiters and the impoverished 
exploited.
In order that these contradictions, these classes 
with conflicting economic interests, may not anni­
hilate themselves and society in a useless struggle, 
a power becomes necessary that stands apparently 
above society and has the function of keeping down 
the conflict and maintaining ‘order.1 And the power, 
the outgrowth of society, but assuming supremacy 
over it and becoming more and more divorced from 
it, is the state.5
The extent to which any particular state becomes more completely
divorced from the society out of which it came coincides with
the power of the oppressive class over the oppressed; for, as
Engels also says, in order to attempt to subdue these conflicts
and to insure order a force or policing power is required.
This public power of coercion exists in every state.
It is not composed of aimed men alone, but has also 
such objects as prisons and correction houses 
attached to it....6
This much having been said, there remains a further point 
which for Marx and Engels is crucial in explaining the nature 
and function of the state. Me have seen that the state, as 
an institution, was intended to reduce chaos to order. So also 
are police and prisons necessary if the state is to have the 
power it requires in the performance of its functions. The 
question remaining is one whose importance can not be emphasized
I^bid., p. 206
6Ibid., p. 207
7enough for the Marxist. Who, after all, controls the state as
the state controls society? It is the answer to this question
which helps to illuminate the position of Marx and Engels with
regard to the state.
In answering Engels writes that the economically stronger
or wealthier class comes to be the dominant or dominating
political class, and that class "by force of its economic
supremacy becomes also the ruling political class and thus
acquires new means of subduing and exploiting the oppressed 
7masses.® Engels provides us with an example of such oppres­
sion and exploitation in his discussion of the coming into be­
ing of the Athenian state.
He equates the beginning of this oppression and suppres­
sion in Athens with the advent of an economy of exchange and 
with the existence of private and disposal property. He writes 
the following of the transition which would beget an Athenian
constitution:
Here is the root of the entire revolution that 
followed. When the producers did no longer con­
sume their own product, then they lost control of 
it. They did not know anymore what became of it.
There was a possibility that the product might be 
turned against the producers for the purpose of 
exploiting and oppressing them.°
7Ibid., p. 208 
8Ibid., p. 135
With exchange came a medium of exchange: money. With this came 
debt and the traditional difficulties of the debtor: loss of 
citizenship and enslavement.
It was Solon who was sunsnoned to rectify the difficulty, 
and to achieve some kind of balance between the interests of 
debtor and creditor. It was he who erased these debts and con­
fiscated the property of one group in order to divide it among 
the members of another. It was he who, while attempting to 
broaden economic and political equity and equality, established 
distinct classes, and such class distinction provided for levels 
of political right and power according to one's economic well­
being. Finally, it was Solon and his successors who provided 
the basis for the coercive police, a police force consisting 
of slaves for the policing of slaves.
How well this state, now completed in its main 
outline, suited the social condition of the Athen­
ians was apparent by the rapid growth of wealth, 
commerce, and industry. The distinction of classes 
on which the social and political institutions are 
resting was no longer between nobility and common 
people, but between slave and freemen, alien and 
citizen.?
t
In all this we see not only the origin of the Athenian 
polity, but also a genuine effort to provide some sort of 
economic and political justice within that state. The point, 
however, is that justice was assured only for the enfranchised
^Ibid., p. 1U3
9citizen. Class distinction had become rigid. Slaves and resi­
dent aliens were denied economic, social, and political pri­
vilege; for, they were merely in the state, but not of it.
Equity existed to protect only the oppressors, not the op­
pressed. The police, as we have seen, were slaves whose duty 
it was to check the behavior of fellow slaves. They, too, 
were an instrument of the dominant class used to exact required 
behavior from the subservient.
Having said this much of the state, we must also be able 
to account, as a Marxist would, for those states or periods 
when there appear elements and principles characteristic of 
fair and democratic treatment for all classes within the state. 
Do such occurences vitiate the Marxist dialogue on the abso­
lute corruption and oppressive character of the state? This 
question Engels takes special care to answer. He does not 
deny that from time to time universal suffrage and the rule 
of law have been extended to the oppressed as well as to the 
oppressors, but he argues that we must look closer in order to 
determine the motives of the oppressors in such apparently 
equitable behavior.
We have said and will say several times throughout this 
paper that the state seeks to preserve itself, but in so doing it 
also perpetuates class conflict. Still, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the state and fulfillment of the desires of the ruling
10
class would be doomed if such conflict were constant, open, and 
violent. The oppressors must preserve themselves and their 
position, and in order to do this they might be forced to make 
certain and perhaps tacit concessions to the oppressed majority. 
So it is that we find universal suffrage in the democratic 
state, and while this may be a concession to those who are domi­
nated, it has no very great effect upon the power and authority 
of the oppressors so long as they continue to be economically 
dominant.
For as long as the oppressed class, in this case 
the proletariat, is not ripe for its economic 
emancipation, just so. long will its majority regarcl 
the existing order of society as the only one 
possible, and form the tall, the extreme left 
wing.
In a democracy with its elected officials ani its appar­
ent response to public opinion and pressure, the oppressed major­
ity have, on the face of it, gotten the advantage of the tradi­
tional democratic trappings, but Engels argues that this too 
is a sham. Here also wealth is the real criterion for power 
however disguised it may be. He mentions specifically the 
situation in the United States:
In such a state, wealth exerts its power in­
directly, but all the more safely. This is done 
partly in the form of direct corruption of 
officials, after the classical type of the United
1QIbid., p. 211.
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States, or in the form of an alliance between govern­
ment and bankers which is established all the more 
easily when the public debt increases and when cor­
porations concentrate in their hands not only the 
means of transportation, but also production itself, 
using the stock exchange as a center.-*-1
We note that Engels says in a democratic state, wealth ex­
erts its power more safely, but no less than in any other state. 
Here the dominant minority may make concessionsj there may be 
universal suffrage and perhaps equal protection of the law, but 
such concessions don't destroy or seriously hamper the power 
of that minority; for, it has secured at least the partial ex- 
tention and preservation c£ the state and hence its control of 
the state.
The remarks we have made so far are generally typical 
of what Marx and Engels understood by the term "state.0 The 
works written before and after The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State present their views in greater or lesser 
detail, but these don't diverge significantly from what we find 
in this work.
We find that the state for both Marx and Engels is an 
evil, and if it is a necessary evil, it is the necessity of 
one class in suppressing another. For them, unlike the state 
of a theorist like Hobbes, the state is not an evil whose 
necessity lies in its promise of general security and a commodious
11Ibid., p. 210
12
life.12 Bather, they think of the state as essential only if one 
class intends to preserve itself as the dominant one. The state 
does not exist in order to protect and to define the rights of 
this or that individual. It is a construct used by the meiibers 
of the dominant class in order to galvanize their power while, 
in the long run, divesting the other class of its economic and 
social well-being. So it is that Marx writes at the beginning 
of The Civil War in France that “the state power assumed more 
and more the character of the national power of capital over labor, 
of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine 
of class despotism.1,13
He was speaking here of a specific situation in a speci­
fic historical context, but the essential point is character­
istic of states in general and not simply of this or that French 
regime. For Marx, the state is of necessity a kind of unbalance, 
and such imbalance, manifested by the subservience of one class 
to another, is thoroughly characteristic of any state. Implicit 
in his writings and in those of Engels is the certainty that no 
state can even be truly democratic or representative* for, the 
state or polity seems never to serve the interests of all. In
12Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Herbert W. Schneider (New 
York: Dobbs-Merrill Co., 195>b), p. 139.
■^ Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (New York: Interna­
tional Publishers, 1933), P* 38.
and unrealistic* Clearly, even the best of polities and societies 
has its antisocial individual who must be enjoined from taking 
the lives and property of others, dearly, law enforcement and 
corrective institutions must exist in order to deal with such 
type s. ^
There is little textual evidence that tine conventional 
police force or prison of the community or metropolis were what 
Marx and Engels had in mind when they objected so strongly to 
these oppressive organs or tools of the state. There is no veiy 
good reason to believe or to suggest that they were unaware of 
the need for the existence and enforcement of a code of criminal 
justice.
It seems, rather, that they had something quite different 
in mind when they spoke of these bodies of aimed men and their 
prisons. We find, for example, when Marx discusses the February 
Revolution in France and the ill-fated Commune that he has a 
special understanding of a state's police. He writes the follow­
ing of the Paris Commune and its dealings with the bourgeoisie's 
polices
Instead of continuing to be the agent of the 
central government the police were at once stripped
Ik
Even More's Utopia recognizes the possibility of legal 
offense and transgression." One may see, for example, how such 
offenders are punished. Cf. St. Thomas More, Utopia, (London:
J. M. Dent & Sons, 1957), Bk. II, p. 79,
15
of its political attributes and turned into the res­
ponsible and at all times revocable agent of the 
Commune.
The police power Marx describes here is not the force which 
acts to insure law and order at and within all levels of society; 
it is an extension or tool of the oppressive class, and the order 
it insures manifests itself in the suppression of the working 
class. The older it imposes is not imposed uniformly upon this 
or that individual transgressor, but upon an entire class. The 
law under which the police or armed men act is the law dictated 
by the dominant minority. These are the police who act as 
strikebreakers in suppressing the proletariat, and these, accord­
ing to Marx, are the armed men who put an end to the Paris Com­
mune# These were the armed men of the bourgeoisie who murdered 
the innocent and massacred political prisoners. These were the 
•bloodhounds of order* who changed the Comnune into pandemonium 
When Engels writes of the state as “nothing but a machine for the 
oppression of one class by another**1? and says that the working 
class must do away with the "repressive machinery previously 
used against itself,1 he speaks in the previous paragraph of 
the nature of this machinery:
17Ibid., p. hO.
1®Ibid., pp. 58-60.
1?Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels (New York: Double­
day & Co., 1959), P. 362.
16
It was precisely the oppressing power of the 
former centralized government, army, political police, 
bureaucracy which Napoleon had created in 1798 and 
which since then had been taken over by ever new 
government as a welcome instrument and used against 
its opponents.20
As we see, it is the police as a political arm of the 
dominait class which J&rx and Engels so oppose, and this is an 
instrument far different in its purposes and tactics from the 
conventional police force. Here the police as armed men amount 
always to a militant enemy of the proletariat.
If vhat has been said so far is indicative of the Marxist 
view and understanding of the state, we are prepared to proceed 
to the next phase of our analysis. We mentioned at the outset 
that we must decide not only what Marx and Engels meant by the 
term "state,” but also whether their understanding of the state 
was significantly different from what the term has meartin much 
important traditional political theory. We may turn now to a 
brief discussion of that issue.
^Ibid., p. 360
CHAPTER in
MARXIST AND THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF STATE
In order to satisfy ourselves as to the relationship of 
the Marxist understanding of the state to that of traditional 
political theory, we have chosen to discuss briefly what seems 
to be a common and important area of agreement among such signi­
ficant political theorists as Hobbes and Rousseau. We neither 
attempt to deny or think it wise to deny the existence of areas 
in which the political thinking of each of these men is differ­
ent, but are concerned with showing what these theorists think 
of as the end or justification of the statej for, in this matter 
they seem largely to agree.
We begin this discussion with Hobbes and what he says 
is the purpose and end of the state. The broad outline of his 
political theory is familiar to the most casual student of 
political theory, and thus requires little explanation.
He begins with the now famous description of the state 
of nature. In describing that state of affairs, he asserts, 
initially, that all men are genuinely equal, but for Hobbes 
equality doesn't mean anything quite like equality of oppor­
tunity or right. He means, rather, that men in the state of
18
nature, the pre-political existence, are equally strong or weak. 
This is simply to say that no man has any spe cial or significant 
physical or mental advantage over another in nature.
For as to the strength of body the weakest has 
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by 
secret machination or by confederation with others 
that are in the same danger with himself. 21-
In the natural state men are without the protection of law
or civil authority, and each is threatened by the possible loss
of life or property. No man is truly secure, and all live under
the actual or potential threat to their lives and holdings. It
is this situation that leads to a condition of war "and such a
war as is of every many against every man."
In such condition there is no place for industry 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain and conse- 
auently no culture of the earth...and which is 
worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent 
death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.22
Because men want to survive and desire the commodious life, 
they are compelled to band together and to attempt to replace 
the precariousness of their existence with a state of peace and 
security. It is man*s rationality which reveals to him the laws 
of nature, and dictates to him the need for active striving to 
attain such security. Because men want peace and the commodious
21Hobbes, ojd. cit., p. 105.
22Ibid., p. 107.
life, they become parties to the social contract and surrender 
certain of their rights to a sovereign power or body. They, 
of course, do not and can not surrender the right to their own 
self-preservation as that would contradict the reason for the 
covenant. With a covenant and a sovereign power sufficient 
to enfoce and sustain the consequences of such a covenant, the 
state and its civil law have been brought into being.
This is, of necessity, only the outline of the transition 
from the natural to the civil state. One could mention Hobbes* 
laws of human psychology tfiich make manifest such a transition, 
but for our purposes it is sufficient to indicate that Hobbes 
was certain that man's concern for his preservation, in conjunc­
tion with his rationality, forced him to abandon the natural 
state in deference to the polity.
There is also much discussion and debate as to whether 
Hobbes actually accepted or insisted upon the historical state 
of nature. Again, the resolution of this debate is of no great 
importance here; though, we might mention the view of an im­
portant contemporary comnentator of Hobbes, C. B. MacFherson. 
I&cPherson insists that the state of nature is merely a device 
or an hypothesis which demonstrates the way men would behave 
in the absence of authority to enforce law of contract.
The state of nature was for Hobbes a condition 
logically prior to the establishment of a perfect 
(i.e. completely sovereign) civil society; what
he deduced from the state of nature was the need for 
men to acknowledge the perfectly sovereign state 
instead of the imperfectly sovereign states they 
now had.
We have seen implicit in viiat he has said that the state 
j is not a good in any absolute sensej it is only better better 
than the dangerous and insecure state of nature. Yet the state 
in the Leviathan is a necessaiy evil and is requisite if men are 
to secure any sort of peace and stability. With this in mind, 
Hobbes begins the second part of the work with what he assumes 
to be the reason for the existence of a conmonwealth.
The final cause, end or design of men, who 
naturally love liberty and dominion over others, 
in the introduction of that restraint upon them­
selves in vhich we see them live in commonwealth, 
is the foresight of their own preservation— that 
is to say of getting themselves out from that 
miserable conditions of wa
This is Hobbesr most succinct and perhaps dearest state­
ment of the need for the state. It is a necessaiy tool used 
to control aggressive and unrestrained human nature. It is no 
panacea, and in order to provide peace and security it must take 
from men many of the rights they had in nature. Still it is an 
improvement over the prior state, or speaking unhistorically, 
life under law is, according to Hobbes, far better than a life
23c. B. MacFherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism (Oxfords The Clarendon Press, 196277 PP* 21-22.
consequent to the natural
i, o£. cit., p. 139.
21
■where law and uniform authority are absent. What Hobbes says 
of the state as a device for instituting order is not very dif­
ferent from Engels* analysis of the evolution of the state as 
a power "for keeping down conflict and maintaining order." But 
Hobbes goes on to say more than this; for, the commonwealth he 
describes is not fragmented by class division such that only a 
segment of the population profits while another segment stands 
to gain nothing. In speaking of the covenant and the conmon- 
wealth it begets, Hobbes writes the following:
This is more than consent or ooncordj it is a 
real unity of them all in one and the same person, 
made by covenant of every man with every man in 
such manner as if every man should say to every 
man, I authorize and give up my right of govern­
ing myself to this man, pr to this assembly of 
men, or this condition, that you give up your 
right to him and authorize all his actions in
like manner.25
Whether one is a champion or an antagonist of Hobbes* po­
litical theory, it seems that at least this point must be granted: 
The state does not exist for the exclusive benefit of a singLe 
group or class. As Hobbes describes it, it is to benefit all 
men within the commonwealth. It is not the instrument this or 
that class uses to oppress another class. It is an instrument 
vhose function it is to provide peace and security for all, and 
not for the few at the expense of the many. Hobbes speaks of
Ibid., p. Ill2.25
a united multitude, and presumably he does not intend by such 
a phrase that the state is bom to instill and perpetuate 
divisions among men. If it is born of such divisions, its 
purpose, ideally, is to eliminate them and their conse­
quences. It is this that Hobbes takes to be the end or 
purpose of the polity. It is this view with respect to the 
state's function that we must keep in mind as we discuss the 
relationship between classical political theory and Marxist 
comunism.
In moving now to the political theoiy of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau and to his Social Contract of 1762 and The Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality, it again becomes necessary to 
stress the fact that he, like Hobbes, is mentioned in this 
analysis in an effort to determine the extent to which Marx's 
and Engels' view of the state relates to these earlier and most 
influential views.
In some sense Rousseau represents the culmination of 
those political philosophies and theories whose point of depar­
ture is the state of nature, and after him the primitive or 
natural state seems to become a less important methodological 
approach to formal political philosophy. Employing the state 
of nature, he begins the first book of the Social Contract with 
what has become one of the most famous utterances in all of 
Western philosophy: "Man is born free; and everywhere he is
23
in chains." This sets the tone of what follows; for, Rousseau 
seems actually to mean that man in the natural state ought to 
be free, but in fact he is not. Perhaps, he was speaking of 
man in the state of nature, but of man in the civil state, in 
which case being born free while being everywhere in chains
suggests the problem of the reconciliation of individual free-
26
dome with the existence and demands of the state•
Man as he is described in the Social Contract is fettered
in and by the state of nature in much the same way that Hobbes'
pre-political man was fettered. The natural state represents,
once again, a precarious and thoroughly troubled existence;
though, Rousseau*s account presents us with fewer of the details
than that of Hobbes. Nonetheless, men are still concerned with
their individual self-preservation and such preservation is never
sure in the natural state.
I suppose men to have reached the point at vhich 
the obstacles in the way of their preservation in 
the state of nature show their power of resistance 
to be greater than their resources at the dis­
posal of each individual for his maintenance in
that state.2'
He goes on to say that in order to gain the freedom they 
ought to have and to insure their self-preservation, men are
Jean Jacques Roussea, The Social Contract, trans. and 
intro. G. D. H. Cole (New York: C. P. Dutton and Co., 19^ 0), 
p. xxviii.
27Ibid., p. 13.
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forced to quit the state of nature. The manner in which men leave 
that state and replace it with another became both the subject 
and problem of the Social Contract. The major problem is that 
of developing some common and protective association or organi­
zation which will protect each individual and an association of 
men in which each man, says Rousseau, “regains his original rights 
and resumes his natural liberty.“28 Furthermore, men must be 
associated in such a way as to give no man a right or power at 
the expense of another. The association or organization of men 
which emerges is the state or republic achieved as a res ult of
the social compact:
Each of us puts his person and all his power 
in common under the supreme direction of the 
general will, and, in our corporate capacity, 
we receive each member as an indivisible part 
of the whole.29
With the birth of the state, men seem for the first time 
to gain the natural rights which, paradoxically, they were de­
prived of in the state of nature. Hobbes said, as we have 
mentioned, that in this natural state all men were essentially 
equal, and it was largely this equality which was responsible 
for the difficulties of such a state. Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau 
thinks of the original compact and of the state which evolves
^Ibid., p. l£.
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therefrom as mechanisms for making equal the men who are by nature 
essentially unequal. In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 
we see how natural inequality, differences in strength and wit, 
in conjunction with the desire for property, destroys the tran­
quility of the state cf nature and leads to "unequal fortune" 
and unequal treatment of men. The coming into being of the 
kind of state described in the Social Contract, a state directed 
by the "general will" for securing the common good, will remedy 
the ills of such inequality. He says that the inequality of the 
pre-political existence is eclipsed, through the social compact, 
by an "equality that is moral and legitimate, and that men, who 
may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become equal by con­
vention and legal right."5®
So it is that Rousseau asserts that authority, right, and 
duty are all born of a convention: the contract. It xs this 
contract which tames the savageness of men and gives content 
to such terms as "right" and "obligation." We see with Rousseau 
and we saw with Hobbes that ideally the state is to heal the 
breaches among men, and not to perpetuate and worsen them. Like 
Hobbes he concedes that in theory at least man loses something 
in the transition from the natural to the civil state. He loses
JO
Ibid., p. 22. Cf. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 
eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato (New Yorks Bollingen 
Foundation, 1961)* PP» 255-67•
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the liberty he had in nature, as well as the right to everything 
he could take, hold, and maintain. In their place, he gains 
civil liberty and genuine ownership of what he could possess 
in nature only if his strength were sufficient. The civil liberty 
he gains from the contract is not the function of individual strength 
or cunning, but is rather guaranteed and limited by the general 
will.
The general will is one among that class of categories and 
concepts which have provided commentators infinite possibilities 
for interpretation. One often reads that it is not entirely clear 
whether Rousseau meant by the term the force of a majority rule
I
in legal and political decisions or whether he meant something 
like a plurality or perhaps complete unanimity in such deci­
sions and enactments. While the distinction is undeniably 
important— especially with respect to the democratic character 
of the state— it is no more important than the reason Rousseau 
chooses to use such a terra.
We must recall that he introduces the term when he talks 
of the essence or purpose of the social compact. When men give 
up the uncertainty and difficulties of the state of nature and
'
agree to live under the direction of the general will, they 
are, according to Rousseau, doing something more than outlin­
ing the structure and procedures of their legislative and 
judicial bodies. They are gaining not only security and the
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rule of law, but are, in an important sense, becoming part of 
a community.
When we speak here of community, we of oourse mean some­
thing more than a mere collection of individuals held together 
by the need to survive and their accidental geographic proximity. 
It is a much more organic notion, and one in which the indivi­
duals who agree to live under the direction of the general will 
are accepting the fact that the collective interests of the 
corntiunity are not equivalent to those of each of the individuals 
who make it up.
The general will, therefore, represents a unique 
fact about a community, namely, that it be a collec­
tive good which is not the same thing as the private 
interests of its members. In some sense it lives 
its own life, fulfills its own destiny, and suffers 
its own fate.31
What emerges from the concept of the general will and the 
community is a kind of political solidarity. The state is more 
than an association of individuals, each of whcm is concerned 
exclusively with his survival and property. The polity takes 
on a character which is not identifiable with the sum of its 
parts. Rousseau says the following of the newly formed body 
politic:
At once, in place of the individual personality 
of each contracting party, this action of
^Sabine, op., cit., pp. 588-89.
28
association creates a moral and collective body, 
composed of as many members as the assembly con­
tains voters, and receiving from this act its 
unity, its common identity, its life, and its
will.
It is this and similar utterances rtiich exhibit Rousseau*s 
feelings about the state. While it emerges to protect the inter­
ests and property of each individual, it is somehow more than a 
mechanism, to secure only these ends. This state or "public 
person" serves the interests of all its citizens, but it serves 
also its own interests and seeks to preserve itself and its 
own identity. The social compact not only brings the polity 
into existence, but it also gives it the power it requires to 
survive, and to perpetuate itself. Rousseau writes that "it 
is the power which, under the direction of the general will, 
bears, as I have said, the name of Sovereignty."33 While it 
may not be clear, the precise manner in which the general will 
acts, its democratic underpinnings seem obvious enough.
Every authentic act of the general will binds 
or favors all the citizens equally; so that the 
Sovereignty recognizes only the body of the nation, 
and draws no distinction between those of whom it 
is made up.^
This is the manner in which the legislative and judicial
3 R^ousseau, op. cit., p. 15*
33Ibid., p. 28.
3^lbid., p. 30.
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bodies must act with respect to all citizens or members of the 
polity; for, it is a community of interest and the just exercis­
ing of sovereign power regarding all individuals which is typical 
of the polity Rousseau describes. The fact that the state is 
different from its members does not absolve it of the need to 
respond to their wishes and to guarantee the rights of that 
meabership.
Having discussed Rousseau*s Social Contract, as well as 
those areas where he and Hobbes generally agree, we must turn 
now to those areas in which their thinking is dissimilar; here 
we must make at least a few remarks based primarily upon the 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,
Firstly, we note that Hobbes, according to Rousseau, 
deduces the character of natural man, man in the state of nature, 
from his observations of civilized and socialized man.
His state of nature is a statement of the be­
havior to which men as they now are, men who live 
in civilized societies and have the desires of 
civilized men, would be led if all law and con­
tract enforcement were removed. To get to the 
state of nature, Hobbes has set aside law, but 
not the socially acquired behavior and desires 
of men,35
Rousseau objects to such procedure in Hobbes as he feels 
that Hobbes' assertions about natural man contradicts. the very
MacPherson, o£. cit., p, 22, Cf, Leo Strauss, Natural 
Right and Histoiy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 
p. 268,
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character of his investigation of man in the state of nature* 
Hobbes asserts, after all, that primitive or natural man does 
not exist within society, and life is not only nasty and brutish, 
but also solitary.
Thus Hobbes, in employing the hypothetical state of nature, 
is unable to give any reliable or accurate account of man's 
character and behavior prior to the existence of states and 
societies. Rousseau mentions, for example, that Hobbes exag­
gerates the number and nature of passions primitive man seeks 
to satisfy relative to his self-preservation. According to 
Rousseau, these passions are not natural, but are in reality 
the consequences of the effect of society upon men0^
Leo Strauss comments upon this fault which Rousseau finds 
in Hobbes, and helps to make clear the precise nature of the 
difficulty.
Rousseau was brought face to face with a dif­
ficulty which embarrasses most present-day social 
scientists. Not the experience of man, but only 
a specifically 'scientific' procedure, seems to 
be able to lead one to genuine knowledge of the 
nature of man.37
If this is an important difference between Hobbes and 
Rousseau, equally and perhaps more significant is the differ­
ence between Rousseau's primitive man and Hobbes* pre-political
-^ Rousseau, op. cit., p. 222.
^Strauss, oj). cit. , p. 268.
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man. For Hobbes, natural man is primarily egoistic, contentious, 
and rational. The man Rousseau describes in A Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality is obviously much different. Having dis­
cussed the behavior and nature of primitive man, Rousseau con­
cludes that he, unlike Hobbes* rational being, is really sub­
human.
Let us conclude then that man in a state of 
nature, wandering up and down the forests, without 
industry, without speech and without home, an equal 
stranger to war and to all ties, neither standing 
in need of his fellow^ creatures nor having any 
desire to hurt them, and perhaps not even distin­
guishing them one from another; let us conclude 
that, being self-sufficient and subject to few pas­
sions, he could have no feeling or knowledge but 
such as befitted his situation.3®
Natural man is, in fact, more good; than bad. He may dis­
poil another man of his good, but he will do very little beyond 
that. He will not attempt to dominate another; for, terms like 
“dominion,* “subservience,® and “obedience" have no meaning in 
the natural state. In the state of nature one man doesnot de­
pend upon another, and for Rousseau it is dependence and inter­
dependence which beget dominance and servitude.3^
When Rousseau begins tracing the origins of inequality and 
man's encounter with novel and problematic situations, he mentions 
also that it is such encounters and difficulties which force man
3®Rousseau, op. cit., p. 230.
3^Ibid., p. 233.
to develop his faculties, to think, and to reason. New wants 
and more sophisticated desires require for their satisfaction 
still further expansion of reason and the faculties. It turns 
out that men are unequal in talent and ability, and such ine­
quality is felt by all individuals.^ As inequality becomes 
more apparent so also do its effects. Rivalry and competition 
arise and men seek the goods, service, and control of others.
The new-born state of society thus gave rise 
to a horrible state of war; men thus harassed 
and depraved were no longer capable of retracing 
their steps or renouncing the fatal acquisition 
they had made,...**1
Such precarious existence, reminiscent of Hobbes* state 
of nature, ultimately forced men into a civil state in order 
to protect themselves and their property. The reasons for the 
rule of law were supposed to be for the protection of the weak, 
restraint of the ambitious, and security for all. In fact,
those who suggested such a rule were those most concerned with
• * )\0 their own possessions and security.
From only this brief sketch, one may ask with justifica­
tion how the Disource and Sod, al Contract square with each other 
no doubt several explanation of a continuity or reconciliation
^Ibid., p. 21*7. 
-^Ibid., p, 2k9» 
^2Ibid., p. 251,
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have been offered. Professor Sabine suggests, for example, that 
Rousseau's reading of PLato took him from the extreme indivi­
dualism and anti-political thought of the Discourse to a position 
where he could praise the state and community as moralizing 
agents. This is the later view which we find in the Social 
Contract. We may also ask ourselves whether, amidst the simi­
larities and differences between the two, there is any truly 
important area where Rousseau and Hobbes are in agreement*
We would argue that given the very real existence of the 
state, Rousseau, like Hobbes, is concerned not to abolish it, 
but to see it improved, and it is largely for this reason that 
we mention both these theorists. Rousseau is hopeful that the 
state may truly embody his notions about a great coirmunity or 
society of mutal rather than conflicting interests, itousseau 
and Hobbes had still more in common which is of importance for 
our discussion of the position of Marx and Engels regarding 
the traditional view of the state, and in order to determine 
where they stood with respect to that tradition we must ask 
what Hobbes and Rousseau had in mind, at base, when they spoke 
of the state.
Firstly, we mention that Rousseau's writings, like 
Hobbes', were stimulated by the time during which he wrote 
them. While he is often singled out as the author of the 
French Revolution, he wrote at a time when the Revolution was
still years away, and the monarchy was relatively firm. He was 
a bold theorist for the period in which he lived and wrote.
As one can tell from a reading of the Social Contract, he speaks 
in general terms and mentions no particular state or country by 
name in spelling out the positive elements of his political theoryj 
yet, it is no less obvious that much that he says is to represent 
a remedy of the abuses of the current monarchy.
His general remarics had such a way of bearing 
veiy obvious particular application, and were 
so obviously inspired by a particular attitude 
toward the government of his day, that even 
philosophy became in his hands unsafe, and he 
was attacked for what men read between the lines 
of his work.^ 3
Like Hobbes, Rousseau was describing a state or polity 
which he felt represented a substantial improvement over the 
present one. Both he and Hobbes were describing states which 
were in some sense ideal, though not utopian. For purposes 
of this paper we don't imply perfection when he use the word 
■ideal,* Rather, an ideal state is simply one which doesn't 
exist or doesn't exist in the form described by its theorist.
It is, furthermore, a state which its author hopes will one 
day come into being.
Neither the mi i^ty •‘Leviathan** nor Rousseau's "Republic" 
was a name or descriptive term for any existing organization
3U
Rousseau, op. cit. ,  p. x.
or political community; they were descriptive of polities which 
ought to have existed, but didn't. Hobbes and Rousseau des­
cribe, in some detail, civil states and the institutions and 
relationships which make them up. If men want peace and an end 
to civil war or the correction of monarchical abuses, then Hobbes 
or Rousseau would argue for his particular state.^ We note, 
however, that the previous sentence was a conditional utterance 
suggesting that ‘"Leviathan" or the “Republic" has no concrete 
existence outside the thinking of these men and their defenders. 
The polities which they describe and the theories of state from 
which they are derived would, if realized, right particular 
evils and difficulties which actually existed. Hobbes “Common­
wealth" and Rousseau’s "Republic" are significantly different 
from each other, but their purposes, in the broadest sense, 
are the same; for, each is a description of a state which stands 
as an alternative and an improvement over an actual state of 
affairs.
Having reviewed and considered these theories of state 
in what seems to be a major tradition in political philosophy, 
we are prepared to continue with our discussion of the Marxist 
theory. We mentioned at the beginning that Marx and Engels, 
like so many important figures in history, are not only
^Ibid., p. xxvi. See also Sir Leslie Stepnen, Hobbes 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 172-83.
influenced by the times through which they live, but are also 
determinative of those times. We saw with Hobbes and .Rousseau 
that their formal views represent answers or alternatives to 
the polities in which they lived. With Marx and Engels we find 
no less an attempt to correct and amend the abuses of the con­
temporary situation. They, of course, did not look to the state 
as an ideal; for, it was the state that they both feared and 
disliked. We notice however that from a practical point of 
view the state of which the Marxists spoke and that of the 
classical theorists were different in a thoroughly fundamental 
respect. We recall, for example, what Engels wrote in the pre­
face to The Civil War in France:
In reality, however, the state is nothing but 
a machine for the oppression of one class by 
another, and indeed in the democratic republic 
no less than in the monarchy.
While these lines were written as an introduction vo a 
work about a specific struggle and tune, we must not conclude 
that Marx and Engels were addressing their analyses to only a 
few states or polities of the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries 
It is true that Marx, when he criticizes the state in the work 
just cited, is speaking not of an abstraction, but of a parti­
cular state.
Feurer, op. cit., p. 362.
The centralized state power, with its ubiqui­
tous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, 
clergy, and judicature...orgiginates from the day 
of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle class 
society as a mighty weapon in its struggle againstfeudalism.^ 6
Given passages of this sort, we must not fail to notice 
that Marx and Engels are speaking not merely of the French Re­
public, but of the course of history as well. The French Re­
public is simply a contemporary instantiation of a universal 
historical trend. When Engels writes of the Iroquois "Gens" 
in the Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, 
he discusses the coming into being of the state and the emer- 
gent divided society resulting from the breakdown of the golden 
age of gentile society. The course of history, the history 
of the state, has been regretably consistent;
All during the thousands of years of its exis­
tence, the new society has never been anything 
else but the development of the small minority at 
the expense of the exploited and oppressed 
majority. More than ever this is true of the 
present.'4?
Though Marx and Engels are veiy much concerned with the 
existing state of affairs and with the evils it embodies, they 
are also speaking to a problem more general and universal than 
any contemporary state. The states which they describe are
^Ibid., p. 363*
Engels, o£. cit., The Origin of the Family, p. 119.) 7
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not abstractions or possibilities; they are real historical en­
tities. One state may differ from another respecting the 
character and economic basis of the classes involved, but 
the broad pattern is the same for all states. In this sense 
ancient and modern history are decidedly similar.
The modern bourgeoisie that has sprouted from 
the ruins of feudal society has not done away 
with class antagonisms. It has but established 
new classes, new conditions of oppression, new 
forms of struggle in place of old ones.i|8'
Marx and Engels do not suggest an ideal state which would 
alter the course of histoiy, and would serve, like the "great 
Leviathan," as a base for social and political reformation. Such 
a suggestion not only runs counter to their historical metaphy­
sics, but also misses the point. It is, after all, the state 
itself which is responsible for most existing evils, and it 
is the state with its bodies of armed men, prisons, and tangled 
bureaucracies which must be changed. Like Hobbes and Rousseau 
they look to the political and social experience with which 
they are familiar, but their experience tells them that this 
is the causeof existing evils, not the cure for them.
The states they describe are thoroughly concrete expres­
sions of the suppression of one class by another. The classical 
theorists we have discussed argued that the polities they have
Feuer, og. cit., p. 8.
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described would replace chaos with order, anarchy witn law ana 
injustice with justice. Their states are a kind of remedy for 
genuine difficulties, but for the Marxists the state is the seat 
of such difficulties.
Looked at from this viewpoint, we are in a somewhat better 
position to assess tne extent to which the Marxists are related 
to more traditional political theory. Rousseau and Hobbes are 
recommending their respective states as means for social and 
political stability and improvement. Marx and Engels take an 
opposite position. They cannot recommend the state whicn will 
improve matters, for, tne state as they describe and understand 
it, an instrument of class domination, is largely the source of 
these social and political inequities.
Hoboes spoke of a state tnat would maKe secure tne lives 
and property of the men who composed it. Rousseau argued that 
the state he envisioned would make unequals equal ana would pro­
tect with justice all men not just the “fit and the few." These, 
of course, were proposals, and it seems safe to speculate that 
Marx and Engels would have welcomed much of the content of such 
proposals in the absence of class division.
Yet, when Marx talks of the state not as a proposed 
entity, but as it actually exists, he does not find equality 
and uniformity under the law. The actual character of private 
property is, according to Marx, far different from the quixotic
and theoretical statements about it in either Hobbes or Bousseau. 
Marx believes that property, in the state controlled by the 
bourgeoisie, exists for only a fraction of the population and 
that fraction represents the oppressive class.^ Justice and 
liberty in such a state are, from the Marxist point of view, 
guaranteed to the oppressors, but what of the oppressed?
Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the con­
ditions of your bourgeoise production and bourgeoise 
property, just as your jurisprudence is but the 
will of your class made into a law for all....5°
This is the kind of state which has, according to Marx, 
emerged and has come to dominate the majority of the population. 
It has become a tool whose sole function is to secure and in­
sure such dominance, and for him and for Engels it is no less 
inimical to freedom and to general well-being than was the 
state of nature to Hobbes and Rousseau.
The concepts of a total coisnunity and the general will 
were noble theoretical postulates, but they never came to be 
in the manner Rousseau described. This is not to say that the 
state of the bourgeoisie lacks some sort of coianunity or organic 
as well as political structure. The community is, however an 
exclusive one, and as such is one of the bourgeoisie. The 
bourgeoisie holds not only the economic and political power;
^Ibid., p. 23. 
*°Ibid., p. 2k.
It has in addition to these its religion^  its conservative tra- 
dition and what Marx calls its social power, ^  but this com­
munity, like the state which the bourgeoisie uses and controls, 
could only exist insofar as it could dominate and exclude an­
other class much larger than itself. “Society is saved just 
as often as the circle of its rulers contracts, as a more ex­
clusive interest is maintained against a wider one."^ 2
The state as Marx and Engels describe it cannot be, at 
base, good, constructive or useful in correcting society's 
ills J for, it is an instrument which promotes and cements class 
division and the oppression of one class by another. If it is 
useful or fertile in the long run, it is only so insofar as it 
serves the interests and requirements of the oppressors. If 
it is necessary, it is only necessary because the ruling class 
requires a device for sustaining its dominance.
The state is by its very nature oppressive and exploi­
tive, and as such it is, for Marx and Engels, an evil which 
has consistently deprived the majority of its condigned share 
in economic and social well-being. Perhaps the only sense either 
Marx or Engels could have made of a suggestion that a state is
^Ibid., p. 333.
52Karl Marx, The Ei ghteenth Brumaire of Louis Bona­
parte (Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society, l!?I*5)7_p7
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good is not that it has corrected social evils, but rather that 
it has been efficient in maintaining the division of classes and 
the position of the exploiters. One state might be better than 
another; Rousseau's ''Republic" may be an improvement over other 
forms, but this is no concession that the state may be good.
To say that one state is better or is an improvement over an­
other is simply to say that the one serves the exploiters less 
well than the other, thus, by dint of its inefficiency, allow­
ing a greater share of political and economic justice to those 
who are exploited. Still, a better state is not a good state; 
it is simply less oppressive*
Rousseau and Hobbes could speak meaningfully of the dis­
solution of their "Republic® and "Commonwealth" and of the chai ges 
which make a good state sour and become a bad one, but this a 
Marxist presumably cannot and would not say. For him the state 
could not change from good to bad as it could never really have 
been good. This is simply the nature of the state. It has 
never served or treated all men equally, and has always been 
oppressive. The route of transition for the state as conceived 
by Marx and Engels is not from good to bad, but rather from bad 
to worse.
We have seen by now what Marx and Engels meant when they 
spoke of the state, and we have tried to show that their under­
standing of the term was significantly different from the view
of earlier theorists. Hobbes and Rousseau describe states and 
state institutions tdiich, if put into practice, would represent 
improvements over existing polities and institutions. Thus
'
for Hobbes, the sovereign power invested in a monarch would 
eliminate or at least help to eliminate the difficulties result­
ing from the division of power between King and Parliament.
For Rousseau, direct legislative participation would eliminate 
the weaknesses and sham of representative government as it ex­
isted in eighteenth century France. Marx and Engels also des­
cribe the state, but they cannot see it as an instrument for 
social improvement. It is, after all, responsible for the per­
sistence of these inequities and difficulties which must be 
eliminated. Unlike Hobbes and Rousseau, they cannot describe 
and recommend a state; rather, they describe and condemn it* 
Having made these statements, we must now try to see 
whether their descriptions and disapproval of the state made 
Marx and Engels anarchists. Does the hope or assertion that 
the state, as an oppressive device of a dominant minority, will 
wither away lead necessarily to the assertion that there is no 
place for some kind of state in the truly communistic society?
It is to these questions we must now turn.
CHAPTER IV 
MARX, ENGELS AND ANARCHISM
In order to decide whether Marx and Engels were actually 
anarchists with respect to their plans for the state, we must 
of course come to some understanding of the anarchists' position. 
We do not have time in this paper to go into any considerable 
detail regarding anarchism nor can we consider the individual 
positions of each anarchist. We choose, therefore, to talk 
briefly of only one, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the French anar-
« '
chist. He is sometimes thought of as the father of anarchism, 
and was almost certainly the most important influence upon the 
direction of anarchist theory.^3 jt -was also Proudhon whom 
Marx attacked in his work, The Poverty of Philosophy. Proud­
hon was a slightly older contemporary of Marx, and like Marx,
he was dissatisfied with the French Republic under Louis 
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Napoleon.
-^James Joll, The Anarchists (Bostons Little, Brown & Co., 
196U(, p. 67.
^ i t  is interesting to note that he published an attack 
on the Republic in 181*9 for which he was imprisoned, but in 
l8f>l, he welcomed the coup and dictatorship of Louis Napoleon. 
See Joll, pp. 72-73.
While Froudon's writings were numerous and diverse, 
there is a theme that one finds among them which is important 
for our purposes. He is consistently opposed to government 
and to political institutions. He distrusts the state and sees 
it as a device whose primary purpose is to protect individual 
property thus calcifying the inequality begotten by wealth.
He comments upon the Declaration of Rights of the French Revo­
lution and talks specifically about the provision which makes 
eligibility for public office a function of virtue and talent 
alone.
Why, the sovereign people, legislators, and 
reformers see in public office, to speak 
plainly, only opportunities for pecuniary ad­
vancement. And, because it regards them as 
a source of profit, it decrees the eligibility 
of citizens.55
It turns out that actions and policies of the government 
or the state, for Proudhon, amount largely to the legalizing of 
property, and it is property which further broadens the gulf 
between those who do and do not have it. In order to eliminate 
the inequities caused and preserved by the state, the state 
must itself be eliminated. Society must be reorganized along 
utterly new and equitable lines. It must be based upon the 
interests and interrelation of interests of all the people
55
Irving L. Horowitz, ed., The Anarchists (New York: 
Dell Publishing Co., 1961*), p. 105.
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involved;
En derniere analyse, que tout le monde etant 
gouvernement, il n*y a plus de gouvememento La 
negation du gouvernement surgit ainsi de sa 
definition: Qui dit gouvernement representatif, 
dit rapport des interets dit absence de gouverne­
ment.
While it is not immediately obvious why the relationship 
of interests necessarily means the absence of government, the 
point may be this. The relationship and interaction of interests 
along with the absence of private property obviate the need for 
the state or government; for, according to Proudhon, it is largely 
the function of government to protect private property and sel­
fish, individual interest.
It was Proudhon’ s hope that industrial and economic 
reorganization would eventually replace government, and a new 
social order would come into existence.
L*association libre, la liberte, qui se borne 
a maintenir l'egalitie dans les moyens de pro­
duction, et ^equivalence dans les exchanges, 
est la seule forme de societe possible, la 
seule juste, la seule vraie...le gouverenment de 
l'homme par l ’homme, sous quelque nom qu'il se 
dequise, est oppression: la plus haute per­
fection de la societe se trouve dans I 1union 
de l'ordre et de l'anarchie.57
^ P. J. Proudhon, Oeuvres Completes, vol. IX, La Revolu­
tion Sociale (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et 
Sociale, 1936), p. 290.
3h6,
^ Ib id .,  vol. IV., Qu*est-ce que la Propriete?, p.
kThus for Proudhon government in any form amounts to op­
pression and must be replaced by something else. While it is 
not always clear how the repla cement and transformation are to 
occur, it is manifest that they do.
We mention Proudhon because he is among the most important 
anarchists of the period during which Marx and Engels wrote.
We are not here concerned with the details of Marx's attack on 
Proudhon in The Poverty of Philosophy as he addresses hins elf 
primarily to the technicalities of the anarchists*s economic 
views. There is, in addition, some evidence that Marx's deal­
ings with Proudhon were less a function of doctrine than of 
fferx's desire to secure an important figure in the formal growth 
of European socialisn.^
We are, of course, concerned to see whether Marx and 
Engels were themselves anarchists. When they spoke of the 
withering away of the state and the coming into being of a new 
social order were they simply echoing or parroting the position 
of men like Proudhon? We mention the anarchists in order to 
supply background for the answer to what is at this point our 
most important question. Do Marx and Engels really expect 
the state to disappear or wither away after the revolution 
and emancipation of the proletariat is complete? In short,
58 .
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wwhat happens to the state when society has been reconstructed 
along purely comnunistic lines? In order to answer this ques­
tion, we must turn once again to an analysis of the relevant 
text.
As we said on the first page of this paper, there are many 
who are aware of the phrase, "withering away" of the state, but 
what that phrase means is not fully entailed by those few words. 
There are many equally aware of the fact that there will be a 
transitional period between capitalistic and communistic economy 
and society often called the "dictatorship of the proletariate." 
This too is a neat utterance whose meaning is not as clear as it 
might be. Lenin, in State and Revolution, suggests interpreta­
tions for both of these phrases.
He writes that eventually, when the workers have freed 
themselves of domination by the minority who make up the bourge­
oisie and have taken control of the machinery of government, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat will have begun. This he 
argues is merely a period of transition; though, no one can 
say with certainty how long this transition will last.
During the transition from capitalism to com­
munism, suppression is still necessary; but it 
is the suppression of the minority of the ex­
ploiters by the majority of the exploited. A 
special apparatus, special machinery for suppre­
ssion, the ‘ state,1 is still necessary, but 
this is now a transitional state, no longer a
k9
state in the usual sense.%9
More specifically, he says that this dictatorship and con- 
tol of the state machinery by the formerly exploited majority
lasts only as long as it is required in order to break the re-
i •. %
sistance of the original exploiters, i.e . to destroy capitalism 
and to eliminate any vestiges or seeds of class division. Ac­
cording to Lenin, it is this dictatorship of the proletariat 
which marks the beginning of the withering away of the state;
,
for, the proletariate uses the state machinery to destroy the
:
state itself. This is to say that it uses that machinery to 
destroy classes and class distinction which, as we have seen,
■
are the primary reasons for the existence of the state which 
Marx and Engels have described.
It was Engels who used the phrase "withering away," to 
explain ■vhat would happen to the state. He used the phrase in 
the Anti-Duhring in conjunction with his brief remarks about 
............. .....—
the coming into power of the proletariat. "The proletariat 
seizes the State power, and transforms the means of production 
in the first instance into State property."^0 These lines, 
along with those of Marx in the Critique of the Gotha Program, 
show rather precisely Lenin's source for what he says of the
^Lenin, op. cit. , p. 7lu
^Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Duhring's Bevolution in 
Science (New York: International Publishers, 1 £1*9), p. 3llu
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transitional dictatorship of the proletariat, but Engels says 
more which bears directly upon the future of the state. Re­
ferring to the lines just quoted he continues:
But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as 
the proletariat, it puts an end to all class dif­
ferences and class antagonisms, it puts an end 
also to the state as the state. . . .As soon as there 
is no longer any class of society to be held in 
subjection; as soon as, along with class comina- 
tion and the struggLe for individual existence 
based on the forner anarchy of production, the 
collinsions and excesses arising from these 
have been abolished, there is nothing more to 
be repressed which would make a special repres­
sive farce, a state, necessary. The interference 
of the state power in social relations becomes 
superfluous in one sphere after another, and then 
ceases of itself. The government of persons is 
replaced by the administration of things and the 
direction of the process of production. The state 
is not ‘ abolished,1 it 'withers away. ‘6l
Before analyzing these crucial remarks about the future
of the state, we mention also a passage of similar content
from the Manifesto of the Communist Party. After Marx and
Engels have outlined the ten point program of the proletariat's
revolution, they make a few remarks about the fate of the state
and political power:
When, in the course of development, class dis­
tinctions have disappeared and all production has 
been concentrated in the hands of a vast associa­
tion of the whole nation, the public power will 
lose its political character. Political power,
Ibid. , p. 315- For what are the same thoughts and 
practically the same wording as this passage, see Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific. , p. 69.
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properly so called, is merely the organized power 
of one class for oppressing another.
At this juncture, it might appear that Engels, Marx and 
possibly Lenin are no less anarchistic than a man of Proudhon*s 
persuasion. A superficial glance at the preceding textual 
material would certainly indicate that this was the case.
These are, after all, the classic remarks on the withering 
away of the state, and all of them seem to suggest, using only 
slightly different wording, what Proudhon hoped for. We em- 
phasize, however, the fact that this apparent similarity may 
hide more than it reveals, and citing these passages without 
comment and analysis would simply not be sufficient. We are ask­
ing, in short, whether these passages really mean that the Marx- 
ists look to the day when the state will have completely ceased 
to be. In order to answer this question, we must look more 
closely as what Engels and Marx say regarding the ultimate de­
cay of the state.
We read in the text that once the proletariat has seized 
the state power, and has made private property and production 
into state property and production, it has sounded the death 
knell for itself as a class, for classes and class conflict in 
general, and for “the state as the state.” What does he mean
'euer, ego. cit., p. 29.
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and how is it that such consequences follow? Given the Marxist 
description of the state, Engels can easily deduce such conse­
quences.
The proletariat, the oppressed majority, seizes property 
and means of production, but from whom does it seize these? It 
seizes them from the economically dominant and oppressive min­
ority, the bourgeoisie. It is, as we have seen, the class in 
whose hands the wealth is concentrated. Once the minority has 
been stripped of its economic power, it ceases also to be the 
dominant class. It has lost the economic power it requires to 
sustain itself, and without that it has lost its political power 
as wellj for, as we have been told so often in the writings of 
Engels and Marx, “the state power assumed more and more the 
character of the national power of capital over l a b o u r . . . . ”^3 
It is the presence of economic differences between one class and 
another which is primarily responsible for their distrust ard 
hostility toward each other. When the economic differences be­
gin to vanish so also do the hostility and antagonism. Ojice the 
proletariat has converted private property into state property, 
neither class has exclusive possession of capital and property 
as the bourgeoisie had had. It is true that the proletariat 
will for a time control this production, but its purpose in
^3Marx, op. cit., The Civil War in France, p. 38.
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doing this is not that of prolonging itself as a distinct class, 
and Engels says that once the economic basis for class distinc­
tion is gone so also do classes vanish. As economic imbalance 
and the "individual struggle for existence" based upon that im­
balance begin to disappear so also do the classes which were de­
fined in terms of that economic inequity,. But without classes 
and class antagonism, the state, according to Engels, ceases to 
exist "as the state,"
The inference which stems from what we have just said, 
in conjuction with nil at we have said earlier in this paper, 
seems fairly clear. The state is, in the final analysis, de­
fined in terms of classes and class antagonisms; it is the mani­
festation of the power of one class, a wealthy minority, over 
another, a deprived majority. When these two distinct poles 
no longer exist, the state no longer exists and the state's 
special bodies of armed men and prisons will not be necessary 
if all traces of class distinction have truly disappeared.
So it is that Engels says the state becomes superfluous 
as soon as classes and the need one class has for suppressing 
another disappear. The state was, in fact, the guardian and 
hallmark of such division. When these divisions vanish so 
also must the state as Marx and Engels describe it. The state 
will wither away to the eotent that classes and their antagonisms 
wither away.
We find also in the Manifesto that after political power, 
“the organized power of one class for oppressing another, " is 
seized by the proletariat, the existence of classes begins to 
fade. The proletariat will, for a time, be the ruling class 
insofar as its being dominant is necessary in order to eliminate 
those conditions characteristic of the rule of the bourgeoisie. 
Here again, once private property and capitalistic modes of pro­
duction have been eliminated, the reasons for class antagonism 
cease to be. When the causes of such antagonism no longer exist; 
neither will classes themselves.^ Because this is so, Marx can 
say that "the public power will lose its political character"^ 
when political or state power, the power one class uses in domi­
nating another, no longer exists.
In these passages from the Manifesto, Anti-Duhring, and 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific the point is always the same. 
After its victory, the proletariat inherits and must for a while 
use the machinery of the state in order to eliminate those con­
ditions which first made the state necessary. The oppressive 
state is thus used to destroy the framework upon which it rests. 
Once this framework begins to crumble so also does the state.
We see also in these passages that a point will be reached where
5these elements characteristic of the political and economic domi­
nation of the bourgeoisie will either be eliminated or reorgan­
ized. This will lead in turn to the end of the period in history- 
characterized by class division and classes themselves. Of this 
stage and of what follows from it Engels write: "These classes 
must fall as inevitably as they once rose. The state must irre­
vocably fall with them.''66
If one insists that Marx and Engels argue consistently 
that the state will eventually disappear and will find its way 
■into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning 
wheel and the bronze a x , ^  then he must also accept the Marxist 
conception of the state. Thus the question of whether Marx and 
Engels were anarchists turns on their conception of the state.
If one argues that Marx and Engels thought of the state ex­
clusively and consistently as an oppressive device of the rul­
ing class, then their insistance upon its disappearance would 
apparently justify the argument that they were anarchists. If, 
however, it can be shown that they spoke of a state which was 
not a function of class division and of a future state which 
could exist and have its legitimate functions in a classless 
communist society, then the claim that Marx and Engels were
66
Engels, op. cit. ,  The Origin of the Family, p. 211.
^Feuer, op. cit. ,  p. 39U.
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anarchists ceases to be sound. In what follows, we will attempt 
to show that the existence of a truly communist society is not 
inconsistent with the existence of a state which, because of the 
absence of classes, is no longer an instrument of oppression.
CHAPTER V
THE STATE IN A CLASSLESS SOCIETY
We argued earlier in this paper that the analysis and 
characterization of the state given by Marx and Engels does not 
square in significant respects with what others have said about 
the nature and function of a state. To speak of the state only 
as the instrument of one class for oppressing another is to 
evade, for example, the administrative functions commonly as­
sociated with the state. Their description of the state as an 
instrument for the enslavement of the majority of the popula­
tion says little of the state as an instrument for carrying out 
the business of a nation or a people. We are certain, however, 
that Marx and Engels were aware of the need for carrying out 
this business. In short, we are asking whether the disappearance 
of an instrument of oppression really means the disappearance 
of the state. The evidence actually indicates that Marx and 
Engels have not just one, but two distinct notions of the state. 
The one we have been discussing is the more apparent in a gen­
eral reading of their works, and is the one we talk of when we 
insist that Marxist doctrine entrails the withering away of the 
state. This is the state as an instrumentality of the
exploiting minority. This is the state which finds its embodi­
ment in the corrupt bureaucracy, special bodies of armed men and 
prisons.
Still, there is another view of the state about ■which Marx 
and Engels speak; though, they present us with almost no detail 
as to its operation and make-up. This we think is a state which 
replaces the "state." This is the state which comes into being 
when the oppressive arm of the bourgeoisie ceases to be. This 
is the state which removes Marx and Engels from the camp of 
anarchism, and forces us to modify any categorical assertion 
that the state must fall if the dream of Marxist communism is 
to be realized. In what follows we hope to show that it is 
only a particular kind of state that withers away, and that 
when that state dies another state of a different sort takes 
its place.
Such an assertion may appear to be untenable; for, have 
we not been discussing the eventual disappearance of the state 
suggested by Marx and Engels in so many of their works? In 
their informal writings we find similar assertions. In his 
letter to August Bebel, a letter Lenin mentions in State and 
Revolution, Engels writes that "with the introduction of the 
socialist order of society the state will of itself dissolve 
and disappear,"68 He says further on in the same letter that
^Karl Marx, Selected Works, ed. C. P. Dutt, vol. II 
(New York: International Publishers, 1933), p. 591.
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at whatever time it is possible to speak meaningfully of freedom* 
“the state as such ceases to exist. with, these apparent counter­
examples in mind, we turn to the text in an attempt to show that 
the state will have its place even after the institution of a truly 
coramunistic society.
We look first at what Marx wrote about the Paris Commune 
in The Civil War in France. Though he was speaking of the 
Commune and not of the ultimate victoiy of communism, his remarks 
about the state cannot be summarily discounted. He mentions the 
plans the Coirmune would have implemented had it succeeded. Among 
them were plans for remodeling of the central government of 
France.
The few but important functions which would 
remain for a central government were not be be 
suppressed, as has been intentionally misstated, 
but were to be discharged by communaL and, there-* 
fore, strictly responsible agents.?0
We mention these lines in an attempt to make clear the
fact that fferx recognized that there were certain functions
which a government could have under its control. He says further
that the repressive institutions of the state were to have been
eliminated by the Commune while its “legitimate functions” would
have come under responsible direction.
In itself, this much is not sufficient proof that Iferx
^ Ib id . ,  p. 592.
70
Marx, op. cit., The Civil War in France, p. 33.
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or Engels finds a place for the state in classless society; how­
ever, in admitting that the state has some legitimate functions, 
Marx is at least suggesting that certain elements of the state 
are not oppressive in themselves. Even granting this point, 
one may argue that what has been said is inconclusive. The 
Commune is not precisely what Marx and Engels had envisioned 
as a truly communistic society. Even if it were, one could 
argue that the existence of certain state functions does not 
necessarily entail the existence of the state. In order to 
probe more deeply into what Marx said of the future state, we 
turn to what he said on the subject in The Critique of the Gotha 
Program.
The Critique addressed itself to what Marx felt were in­
adequacies in the proposed program for uniting Germany's two 
socialist parties. In the course of his criticism, Marx makes 
some remarks about the state which for our purposes are impor­
tant and illuminating.
In the fourth section of his Critique, Marx discusses 
the Geiman 'Workers Party and its hope for a "free state." At 
first, he attacks the notion of a free state, and from the tone 
of the first few lines, we are led to believe that his remarks 
will simply buttress what has been said earlier about the oppres­
sive character of the state. This, however, is not the case.
This time Marx does not say categorically that the state will
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wither away or that it must be abolished; rather he writes the 
following:
Freedom consists in converting the state from 
an organ standing above society into one com­
pletely subordinated to it, and today also the 
forms of the state are more free or less free to 
the extent that they restrict the 'freedom of 
the state.'71
We notice that Marx has not said anything here about the 
disappearance of the state; he is talking instead of a kind of 
metamorphosis. Just as in his remarks in The Civil War in France, 
he is suggesting that the state will and must serve rather than 
dominate society. Presumably, the last sentence of this passage 
is tantamount to saying that the relative freedom under any 
state is a function of the extent to which the "freedom of 
the state," the oppressive behavior of that state, is restriced. 
While this passage may be construed as an argument for the wither­
ing away of the oppressive state, it by no means asserts that 
the state taken in some broader sense, the state as it performs 
“legitimate function,® must fall. Marx speaks not of annihila­
tion, but of conversion:
The question then arises: what transformation 
will the state undergo in communist society? In 
other words, what social functions will remain 
in existence there that are analogous to the pre­
sent functions of the state? This question can 
only be answered scientifically and one does not
^Siarx, op. cit., The Critique of the Gotha Program,
p. 576.
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get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousand­
fold combination of the word people with the word
state.72
Once again, the text speaks for itself. The state in a 
communist society will not be a device for maintaining and ex­
tending the power of a particular class; for, such a society 
will of course be classless. This is not to say that such a 
society would be possible only in the absence of a state. The 
state which dominated the majority, the coercive arm of the 
ruling class, will cease to exist, but we have yet to determine 
what sort of state is to take its place.
Marx says that legitimate social functions will remain 
in existence; however, he does not tell us what these are. We 
mentioned earlier, though in a somewhat different context, that 
with the ultimate disappearance of the oppressive state the 
government of persons will yield to the administration of things 
and to the direction of production.73 Neither Marx nor Engels 
has been veiy specific in cataloguing those elements entailed 
in the performance of social functions and the administering of 
things. Whatever is entailed, there is resson to believe that 
in the classless society it will be the state which handles and 
solves the problems of administration and direction of production
72Ibid., p. 577.
73
Engels, op. cit. ,,  Anti-Duhring, p. 315.
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and distribution. To document this point, we must again return 
to the text.
In most of their major works, Marx and Engels remind us 
of the oppressive character of the state, and it is somewhat 
surprising that this is not the exclusive description of the 
state found in these works. Those remarks which suggest a less 
jaundiced view are not as pervasive as those which characterize 
the state as an instrument of the ruling class; yet, such remarks 
are to be found. We look, for example, to a short, but important 
paragraph in Engels’ Anti-Duhring for evidence of a rather differ­
ent state. In the section which concerns us, Engels is discus­
sing the effect of unequal economic distribution and mentions 
the class division which results. These remarks are followed
by some which treat of the state.
Society divides into classes; the privileged and 
the dispossessed, the exploiters and the exploited, 
the rulers and the ruled; and the state, which the 
primitive groups of communities of the same tribe 
had at first arrived at only for safeguarding their 
common interests ( such as irrigation in the East) 
and providing protection against external enemies, 
from this stage onwards acquires just as much the 
function of maintaining by force the economic and 
politica? ' ' ' on  of the ruling class agains the
What is crucial in these remarks is Engels* assertion that
?k[bid. , p. 169, Cf. Solomon Bloom, "The Withering Away of t 
State,® Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. VII, No. 1 (New York; 
I 9I16) . Here we find a discussion of the possibility of a future 
state; though, there is no indication of what this may be like.
subject
6h
the state existed initially in order to protect the common inter­
est, and only later became the guardian of the interests of a 
dominant m i n o r i t y . ^  Contrary to other accounts, the state 
emerges here as something other than the outcoms of class con­
flict. He says something similar in his introduction to The 
Civil War in France:
What had been the special characteristics of 
the former state? Society had created its~~own or­
gans to Took after the common interest, first 
through simple division of labor. But the organs 
at whose head was the state power, had in the 
course of time, in pursuance of their own special 
interests, transformed themselves from the servant 
of society into the master of society,
In this and the previous passage, Engels suggests a view 
of the state rather different from what we might expect from 
him and from Jferx. Here he says quite clearly that the state 
was not inherently evil, corrupt or oppressive, but only came 
to be so with the advent of parochial interests and class an­
tagonism. In both cases, he stresses the initial function of 
the state as the guardian of the common or collective interests 
of the society. These remarks about the early state square with 
what Marx said when he talked of the legitimate social functions 
of the state.
'^Cf. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State, pp. 206-208; Anti-Duhring, p. Q b ; Socialism: Utopian 
and Scientific, p. 69.
^iarx, op. cit., The Civil War in France, p. 17.
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Both are talking about the state and its functions as they 
exist before or after class conflict,, These remarks appear to 
support the contention that there is or can be some kind of state 
that does not require division within society for its existence.
We can, in fact, arrive at what may be a fairly accurate picture 
of something other than a coercive state by looking once more 
at what Engels says of the Iroquois tribal and social organization 
in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.
In his chapter, "The Iroquois Gens, " Engels calls upon the 
work of the American ethnologist, Lewis Morgan, in order to demon­
strate the existence of parallels in the make up of the early 
Greek, Roman and American Indian social structure. It is up to 
a competent anthropologist to determine how sound Engels* analysis 
isj we are concerned with those remarks which pertain specifically 
to the Iroquois "gentes."
He begins his discussion with a glowing account of the 
manner in which the Iroquois elected the sachem, the official 
head during times of peace. In this election, both men and women 
are allowed to vote and all votes are of equal weight. He men­
tions also that the sachem's power was of a purely moral nature 
and that he "had no means of coercion at his coimiand."77 He 
talks of the manner in which a sachem may be removed and of the
77
Engels, o£. cit., The Origin of the Family, p. 101*.
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rules of each "gens" respecting marriage, devising of property 
and mutual protection. He talks of the democratic assembly of 
each “gens. 11 Such assemblies are made up of all the adult male 
and female gentiles, and each has an equal vote when the assembly
nQ
makes its decisions and conducts its business*' Relying upon 
Morgan's investigation, Engels emphasizes the freedom, equality, 
and brotherhood of all those who were part of a "gens,"79 and 
talks approvingly of the council for public affairs.
It was composed of all the sachems and chiefs 
of the different gentes, real representatives be­
cause they could be deposed at any moment. It 
deliberated in public, surrounded by the rest of 
the tribal members, tAio had a ri^it to take part 
in the discussions and claim attention* As a 
rule any one present gained a hearing on his de­
mand*
Beyond this, Engels describes arrangements for burial, war, 
ceremonies and the relationship of one "gens" to another.
Having finished with the descriptive details of his 
account, Engels writes that a study of the Iroquois "gens" 
provides us with the "opportunity for studying the organization 
of a society that does not yet know a state."®-*- In the next
?®Ibid«, p* 107. 
79 
loc. cit* 
8oIbid., p. 112.
^Ib id ., p. 115.
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sentence he tells us, as we might expect, that "the state pre­
supposes a public power of coercion separated from the aggregate 
body of its members. " 82 Once again, we find Engels equating the 
state with an oppressive or coercive force which dominates society* 
This, of course, is consistent with most of his and lyferx* s pro­
nouncements about the state* When he adulates the "gentile con­
stitution" of the Iroquois, he praises both its efficiency and 
its equity; yet, equity extends to all and no tools of oppression 
are required to secure the efficiency*
No soldiers, gendarmes, and policemen, no no­
bility, king, regent, perfect or judges, no prisons, 
lawsuits, and still affairs run smoothly. All 
quarrels and disputes are settled by the entire 
community involved in them, either the gens or 
the tribe or the various gentes among themselves...
Not a vestige of our cumbersome and intricate sys­
tem of administration is needed, although there 
are more public affairs to be settled than nowa­
days: the coiununist household is shared by a 
number of families, the land belongs to the tribe, 
only the gardens are temporaily assigned to the 
households....These cannot be any poor and desti­
tute— the comnunist household and gentes know their 
duties toward the aged, sick and disabled. All are 
free and equal:--the women included.°3
This is Engels* laudatory account of a social organiza­
tion which knows no state, but it seems, rather, that such 
gentile society did not know the state as he and Marx have
flo
Ibid ., pp. 115-116 
^ Ib id .,  p. 117.
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described its the oppressive instrumentality of a ruling class. 
This is significantly different from the bare assertion that it 
knew no state at all. In support of this point, we can compare 
what Engels has said of the Iroquois with his remarks about the 
state which were cited in the Anti-Duhring.
port the contention that Marx and Engels had some conception of 
a state different from that one which equates it with an instru-
It was in this work that Engels mentioned the state as it existed 
before class division. This was the state "which primitive groups
of communities of the same tribe had at first arrived at only
for safe-guarding common interests (such as irrigation in the
Here Engels admits of the possibility of a state which does 
not depend, for its existence, upon the presence and hostility 
of classes. If we consider what he said of the Iroquois and
the State, we find that their social and tribal organization 
really amounts to the kind of state he describes in the Anti- 
Duhring. The Iroquois •gentes® are certainly an instance of 
"the primitive groups of communities of the same tribe" which
We mentioned this passage earlier in attempting to sup-
ment for sustaining the power and position of the ruling minority.
East) and providing protection against external enem ies...."^
their society in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and
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Engels referred to in the Anti-Duhring. About any particular
"gensu Engels writes the following:
t
Each is complete in itself, arranges its 
own local affairs and supplements the other 
groups....
Whenever we find the gens as the social unit 
of a nation, we are justified in searching for 
a tribal organization similar to the one described
above.
In the passage quoted from the Anti-Duhring, we saw that 
according to Engels the state, which was composed of these com­
munities, came into being in order to safeguard the common 
interest and to provide for protection against external ene­
mies. So also in The Origin of the Family, Engels writes of 
the organization of gentes into tribes and tribes into leagues 
and federations. Such larger organizations provided susten-
O/
ance and protection from any former inhabitants of the region. 00
We mention all this not as an exercise in anthropology 
nor in an attempt to point out inconsistencies and peculiarities 
in Engels’ works but because what he says in these works is of 
crucial importance for our discussion of the state in communist 
society. By dint of this comparison of what Engels says in 
the Anti-Duhring and the Origin of the Family and through our 
discussion of Marx’s remarks about the ’legitimate functions"
^Engels, op. cit., The Origin of the Family, p0 116. 
^ I b i d . , pp. 113-llfjo
of the state and the "future state" in communist society, we have 
been trying to make the following points:
1) Engels and Marx do speak of the state, as well 
as certain of its functions, which does not depend 
for its existence upon the existence of classes
or the oppressive rule of a particular class.
2) Engels’ description of the primitive social 
organisation of the Iroquois 'gens* read in corv- 
junction with his remarks about the reasons for the 
existence of a state before class division suggests 
that the federation of ’ gentes' and tribes might 
amount to the kind of state which he says existed 
before such divisions. Though Engels says that 
Iroquois society knew no state because it did not 
•presuppose a public power of coercion,* we cite 
our first point and argue that Engels seems either 
to have forgotten what he said of the state in
the Anti-Duhring or is speaking only of a parti­
cular kind of state, i .e . the oppressive state 
serves the ruling class.
It is hoped that these remarks pertaining to the existence 
of the state outside societies divided and ruled by classes docu­
ment our contention that Marx and Engels do, in fact, speak of 
two distinct states0 They have described in some detail the state 
which will wither away when classes cease to be. The nature of 
the state that represents all of society and exists where classes 
are absent is never made very precise, and with the exception 
of the passages we have already mentioned, it is hardly dis­
cussed at all. The little Marx and Engels say of the classless 
communist society will perhaps help us to see that there can 
be a different sort of state, a state which serves rather than
suppresses society
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What do we know of a society where class antagonisms have 
disappeared? According to what is said in the Manifesto, there 
will come into being “an association in which the free develop­
ment of each is the condition for the free development of all. '1®7 
In isolation, this passage is not terribly informative; fortu­
nately, Marx and Engels say something more. In The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State, Engels says that when 
class division has vanished, society will be able to do away 
with the oppressive machinery of the state, the machinery which 
galvanizes class division, and will be able to organize pro­
duction "on the basis of a free and equal association of the 
producers.*®® As we noted earlier, classless society will re­
place the "government of persons" with the "administration of 
things and the direction of the forces of production." Finally, 
Marx writes in The Critique of the Gotha Program that only when 
a genuinely communal and cooperative society has been achieved, 
and only when class division, division of labor, ^  and the op­
position of manual and physical labor have all disappeared will 
one contribute to society to the extent that he is able ’while 
receiving from society what he actually requires.
®7Feuer, og. cit. ,  p. 29.
OO
Engels, o£. cit., The Origin of the Family, p. 211 
®%euer, op. cit. ,  p. 129.
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Only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois 
right be fully left behind and society inscirbe 
on its banners; from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his need.90
These remarks, though few, are more than broadly descrip­
tive of the classless society; they are also descriptive* of those 
legitimate functions of the state which remain after the oppres­
sive state has fallen away• We are not saying simply or rather, 
simplistically, that one may justifiably claim that a state ex­
ists wherever a sufficiently large number of human beings are 
collected together within the same general boundaries; though,
John Dewey says that "temporal and geographical localization” 
are important, however not sufficient, in attempting to decide 
what we mean when we talk of the state.^ We have argued at 
some length that Marx and Engels speak of a future state and of 
a state which existed or could exist where the division of society 
into classes is unknown or has passed from the scene. What do 
we look to in these brief and incomplete descriptions of a class­
less society which helps us to justify our claim that such a 
society and somsthing we may legitimately call a state are not 
mutually exclusive? We look firstly at the organization of 
society when a classless society has ceased to be an hypothesis
^°Marx, op. cit., The Critique cf the Gotha Program, p. 566.
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John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, (Chicago: Holt 
and Co., 19^6), p. 39.
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and has become a reality.
Once rid of the oppressive machinery which has divided 
society so long, the new society will be concerned, among other 
things, with the "administration of things" and with the direc­
tion of the forces of production. This may certainly represent 
a significant improvement over the concerns of one class for 
dominating another, but how is it to be accomplished? When 
society was essentially a bourgeois affair the answers to pro­
blems of administration were simpler. Then the ruling class 
dominated the labor force and, therefore, production. It ex­
acted taxes and used a bureaucracy and the oppressive instru­
ments it had at its command in order to administer and to pro­
fit from what the proletariat had produced. But all this is 
to pass, and it is now a classless society which must deal with 
the problems of administration and production, and such problems 
will certainly exist. Even the Iroquois, who were anything but 
an industrial society, required their councils, "sachsns," and 
chiefs in order to make and to implement tribal decisions, as 
well as to oversee the tribal land and to handle matters of 
ceremony and defense. Similarly, when Marx speaks of the plans 
of the Paris Commune, he does not overlook the problems of 
administration. He tells how the affairs of each rural com­
mune were to be administered by a body of delegates in a central 
town, and that body would have sent delegates to a still larger
body in Paris.
We grant that the Paris Commune was not the exact pro­
totype of a purely communistic organization nor was the admin­
istration of the Iroquois "gentes" the same as what would be re­
quired in any synthesis of industrial and agricultural society, 
but these differences do not deny the point we are trying to make 
The •admini strati on of things'* and the direction of production, 
whether in a classless society or not, are not simple matters. 
Perhaps, the cumbersome bureaucracy of the bourgeoisie was 
abusive and inefficient, but if it vanishes something must 
takes its place. Instead of parliamentarism, there will be 
some kind of administrative organisation made up of represen­
tatives of the workers.^ Administration is to be more equit­
able and efficient, but Marx and Engels admit that it will still 
be required. Improved production and distribution of the pro­
ducts of labor will not simply happen; rather, they must be 
made to happen.
If these changes in production and administration are to 
be made for the good of the entire society, then it seems a 
justifiable assumption that society will and should have a voice 
in those matters which affect and improve it; its wishes and 
grievances must be heard. This, we noted, was the case in the
------------
92Feuer, op. cit., p. 367.
93oscar Jaszi, "Socialism,” Encyclopedia of the Social 
I Sciences, XIV, p. 201.
'
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pbblic council of the Iroquois ‘'gens." Presumably, the fact that 
a society is classless does not entail the absence of those organs 
and institutions ■which, like the great council, take account of 
the popular sentiment. It is, in short, one thing to speak of 
an association where the free development of an individual con­
tributes to the development of the entire society, but it is 
quite another matter to determine what society expects or de­
mands from the individual in order that both may profit.
Marx talks of an early stage of communist society and 
mentions the individual laborer who, having contributed a quan­
tity of labor to society, receives a certificate which entitles 
him to draw on or to consume a quantity of the total production. 
The same amount of labor he has given to society in one foim, 
he receives back in another
On its face, this amounts to a simple exchange or trans­
action, aid no doubt it would appear to be this simple if one 
failed to mention what is necessary in order for such an ex­
change to occur. It is simply not the case that coianunist 
society emerges fully developed the moment that classes have 
finally disappeared and that with it comes a blueprint far the 
kind of cooperation that makes even the simplest transaction
-^Marx, o£. cit. ,  Selected Works, p. 5^3. This mode of 
exchange, characterized by giving to each according to his con­
tribution, will ultimately be replaced by apportioning accord­
ing to one’ s needs.
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possible. We note, for example, that the certificate must be a 
sound medium of exchange# It must, like currency, have the back­
ing which makes it acceptable and useful. What in the classless 
society will guarantee it? Will good faith and the memory of the 
struggle of the proletariate be sufficient? There are, of course, 
problems of administration connected with the transaction. Where 
does one take his certificate and from whom is he to receive 
it? whom and on what basis is it decided that he has re­
ceived an increment of consumption from society proportional to 
what he has contributed? These are rather specific questions; 
yet, they are questions whose answers must be located among the 
administrative processes of early conmunist society.
Apart from these administrative matters, there must ex­
ist some sort of agreement among the members of society prior 
to any exchange or transaction. There must exist cooperation 
before these kinds of cooperative exchange are possible.
Society must at some time come to an agreement respecting the 
manner in which transaction, production and distribution will 
be handled. But how does society come to agree and to imple­
ment its decisions? Once again it requires institutions through 
which to objectify and to work out the results of its coopera­
tion. It is such organs and institutions which are charged with 
administering the "legitimate functions" of the state.
On the ashes of the old state rises a coranon- 
wealth, devoted to the tasks of production and
other social concerns, and united by the conviction 
that the way to deal with nature and to develop 
human beings in all directions is not through com­
petitive atomism, but through co-perative e f f o r t . . . . 95
One might grant that a truly communistic society entails 
the existence of certain governmental or state functions in 
carrying out its business, but does this mean that the state 
must exist as well? Clearly, if the Marxist vision were ever 
realized, the state as an instrument of oppression would have 
no place. We are at this point asking whether the classless com­
munist society described by Marx and Engels is incompatible with 
the existence of a state which serves, rather than dominates 
society. We think that the two are not incompatible, and in 
what follows shall try to show why this is so*
It was argued earlier in this paper that much of the 
confusion surrounding the Marxist doctrine of the state stems 
from the description Marx and Engels most frequently give of 
the state. This is the characterization of the state as the 
suppressive device of the dominant class. If this were all that 
Marx and Engels meant when they spoke of the state, then the 
state would be an impossibility in classless society. In order 
to determine whether there is another kind of state or, rather, 
something we could willingly call a state in a coirmunist society,
95
M. M. Bober, Karl Marxr s Interpretation of History 
(2nd. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19^0),' P. 275*
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we must avoid thinking of states purely as oppressive or as 
"brooding" omnipresent entities utterly separate from society.
In short, we prefer the approach of John Dewey;
The concept of the state, like most concepts 
which are introduced by 'The,* is both too rigid 
and too tied up with controversies to be of ready 
use. It is a concept which can be approached by 
a flank movement more easily than by a frontal 
attack. 96
While we are not specifically concerned with Dewey and his 
philosophy, certain of his remarks are relevant to the issue of 
the state's place in a classless communist society. His concept 
of the “public” is in many ways analogous to what other theorists 
have said of society or the "community," but what he writes about 
the relationship of the state to society or "public" helps to 
clarify what we mean when we speak of the state, Dewey says 
that "the lasting, extensive and serious consequences of asso­
ciated activity bring into existence a public."97 We find in 
the writings of Marx and Engels that a classless society depends 
largely upon the existence and extent of co-operation or co­
operative actions. The members of a communist society like the 
one described by Engels and Marx have both needs and obligations. 
Contributing to society and receiving from it entail the
Dewey, og. cit. ,  p. 8.
97
Ibid., p. 67.
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associated activity of ■which Dewey speaks* It is also the case 
that the concern for the individual becomes society's concern, 
and conversely the individual is concerned about the problems 
and progress of the society. The replacement of competition 
by co-operation multiplies and strengthens the bonds of associated 
activity.
Society pools its assets in labor, natural wealth, 
capital, and science; calculates the diverse needs 
of its members; and apportions the resources among 
multiple industrial channels, to insure an unin­
terrupted and rich flow of products for every 
want....98
We have argued that the existence of society or of the 
"public" requires the existence of administrative and directive 
functions in order that the business of society may be carried 
on. Co-operation becomes meaningful when it ceases to be only 
an ideal and is objectified in the making and implementing of 
decisions and policy. The yield of successful co-operation 
must be administered even in a classless society where all, 
not merely a few, are to profit from the total labor and out­
put of the society. Communist society does not escape the 
requirements of administration and supervision; neither Marx 
nor Engels suggested that it could. It cannot ignore the wishes 
and decisions of those who make it up, but it must somehow come
98
Bober, op. cit., p. 27$.
to know and to evaluate those wishes#
The point of all this is simply that a communist society, 
like any other society, needs administration and supervision in 
order to satisfy its wants and requirements. How does this re­
late to the existence of the state in such a society?
We refer once again to Dewey who says that where we find 
“the organization of the public effected through officials for 
the protection of the interests shared by its members," there we 
also find the state. What Dewey says of the state and its re­
lationship to common interests or ends is, of course, nothing very 
new. We find something similar throughout much of the history 
of political theory. We are often led to believe, for example, 
that Hobbes thought of the state exclusively as a device for 
bringing about peace, stability, and self-preservation, but we 
should also recall that the state is bound up with something 
called the "commodious life" and with providing those things 
which are in the common interest and which are not available 
outside the state. He tells us of the pre-political condition 
and of the absence c£ the elements of the common good:
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Dewey, o£. cit. ,  p. 67.100
In such condition there is no place for indus­
try, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and 
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation 
or use of commodities that may be imported by sea; 
no commodious building; no instruments of moving 
and removing such things as require force; no know­
ledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; 
no art; no letters; no society....101
Rousseau, like Hobbes, is aware of the state's relationship to
the public interest or the common ends of society's members:
The first and most important deduction from the 
principle we have so far laid down is that the 
general will alone can direct the State according 
to the object for Uiich it was instituted, i.e . 
the common good; for if the clashing of particular 
interests made the establishment of society neces­
sary, the agreement of the very interests made it 
possible....It is solely on the basis of common 
interest that every society should be governed.102
Finally, we mention Edmund Burke and what he says of the 
common interests of society. In his Reflections on the Revolu­
tion in France, Burke talks of the function and nature of state 
and society:
Subordinate contracts for objects of mere oc­
casional interest may be dissolved at pleasure— 
but the state ought not to be considered as noth­
ing better than a partnership agreeitE nt in a trade 
of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some 
other such low concern, to be taken up for a 
little temporary interest, and to be dissolved 
by the fancy of the parties.. . .It  is to be a part­
nership in all science; a partnership in all art;
^"Hobbes, op. cit. , p. 107.
10
^Rousseau, og. cit., p. 23.
82
a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfec­
tion. 103
In the writings of each of these theorists, we find in the 
midst of all their differences an element of agreement: the state 
exists not only or not exclusively to serve and to protect the 
various interests of each individual, but also those of the en­
tire society. With Hobbes and Rousseau, -we find that the common 
good may often be different from what any particular individual 
thinks is in his personal interest; though, on the whole the 
best interests of society will square with those of its indi­
vidual members. So we see that in the Leviathan peace and 
security are bought at a price insofar as the individual is de­
prived of his right to take whatever he can maintain. Nonethe­
less, in divesting himself of the right to everything, he has 
secured his continued self-preservation.
In the writings of Marx and Engels it appears that ul­
timately the individual’ s wishes and good and those of society 
will be substantially the same; thus, the conditions which lead 
to the free development of the individual will benefit society 
as well, and of course society's goals will be of direct bene­
fit to each of its members. In the Marxist communist society, 
the common good finds its expression in the cooperation of
10%dmund Burke, Works, Vol. II  (London: Henry G. Boh.
1885) , p. 368. ---
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all members of the society, and it turns out that society's goal 
is the complete emancipation and development of its members*
The possibility of securing for every member 
of society, through social production, an ex­
istence which is not only fully sufficient from 
a material standpoint and becoming richer from 
day to day, but also guarantees to them the com­
pletely unrestricted development and exercise of 
their physical and mental faculties— this possi­
bility now exists for the first time, but it 
does exist. ^
In a truly communist society the ideals and interests of 
that society are the same; for, society's concern is for the 
individual and its ideal is his continued development and im­
provement. This is the nature of the public interest in the 
classless communist society, and it is the existence of the 
state which makes possible the achievement of vhat is in the 
public interest. We mentioned earlier the complexities of ad­
ministration, distribution, and production in the society en­
visioned by Marx and Engels, and argued that these matters would 
require careful direction if that society is to realize the social 
and distributive justice towards which it aims. The administra­
tion of things is a difficult matter in any society, but when 
a society's ideals and material improvement depend upon the 
equitable administration and production of things, it becomes 
vital that such administration approaches perfection. It is
101*
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in the meeting of such a society's demands that we find the pro­
vince of the state.
We are not saying, as Burke may have said, that society 
and the state are identical. Rather, the state in the communistic 
society turns out to be very much like what Marx and Engels said 
it would becomej it is the servant of society. When coninunist 
society has set for itself its goals or aims, i .e . the libera­
tion and improvement of each of its members, and has delegated 
to some or all of its members the authority required to con­
duct society's business so as to realize its aims and interests, 
we find the state. When Marx and Engels make the renovation of 
production and more equitable share in the total wealth necessary 
conditions for the improvement of that society and its indivi­
duals, they are also forced to concede that such a society can­
not be achieved the the mechanics of production and consumption 
are not adequately administered. Society, whether classless 
or not, will require its organs or institutions through rthich 
to make its decisions and in order to determine whether this 
or that alternative serves the public interest best. We are 
not here confusing or equating "state" and "government," but 
are saying rather than when even classless society chooses, 
as it must, to administer and govern its affairs in the public 
interest; when it chooses to develop itself and its members 
to the fullest extent and does this by a more equitable
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administration of the fruits of society, it has admitted the 
state.
A public articulated and operating through 
representative officers is a state; there is no 
state -without a government., but also there is 
none without the public.10?
The business of society may be administered by occupational 
delegations of the workers10^ or by special representative offi­
cials.
Without representative institutions we can­
not imagine democracy, not even proletarian de­
mocracy; but we can and must think of democracy 
without parliamentarism....It is most instruc­
tive to notice that, in speaking of functions 
of those officials who are necessary both in the 
Commune and in proletarian democracy, Marx com­
pares them with the workers of 'every employer,' 
that is, of the usual capitalist concern with 
its 'workers and managers.,107
Lenin, like Marx and Engels, is conceding the need for 
government and administration in a truly classless society; for, 
without them it could neither mature nor survive. The state does 
not vanish from the scene; rather, its oppressive role is con­
verted into one of service, and it comes to serve not part, 
but all of society. It no longer stands over society; for, 
it has become the guardian of the common interest. The state's
10^Dewey, o£. cit. ,  p. 67.
106
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organs are no longer prisons, disproportionate taxes, and bodies 
of armed men. Institutions fcr the administering of production 
and the making of decisions in the interest of the entire society 
will have replaced the bureaucracy whose concern was for the rul­
ing class. The oppressive state will wither away, but a new state 
emerges and is required in order to make a reality of the slogan: 
“from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
need."
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